Recent Developments in Part-Time Work in EU-15 Countries: Trends and Policy * A growing part-time employment share has been a main feature of a number of industrialized countries over the past two decades. A considerable variation in the rate of part-time work is evident by gender, age group, industrial sector and occupation. The stylized facts support the view that part-time employment represents an important opportunity particularly for young, older and female workers to enter the labour markets of the European Union. For the majority of workers in these groups, the decision to work part-time has been a voluntary one, which is all the more satisfactory in terms of welfare maximization. Our results indicate that the development of the part-time employment rate over time and the strong variation in the PTR across countries are significantly affected by policy and institutions. In particular policy measures geared toward encouraging part-time work are found to be positively related to actual part-time developments. These measures include both the legal framework directly affecting part-time positions and the creation of financial incentives (subsidies and improvement of social protection) to take up a part-time job. Moreover, other labour market institutions, including benefit systems and the stringency of employment protection legislation for regular contracts, are found to significantly but indirectly influence the growth in part-time work.
Introduction
Over the last 20 years, Europe has experienced a dramatic increase in the share of part-time employment. This increase is generally regarded as a positive trend, since the promotion of parttime work may be an important measure through which the flexibility of labour markets can be increased. On the labour supply side, part-time work may increase the labour market choices open to individuals, drawing people into the labour market that were previously unwilling or unable to work. On the labour demand side, it may allow employers to adjust hours worked to fluctuations in demand more easily, facilitating adjustment of production and labour costs. The This suggests that policy, institutions and/or preferences toward part-time work are very different across different regions of the EU.
In recent decades, policies promoting flexible working arrangements have been implemented in several EU countries (OECD, 1998) . Against this background, the objective of this paper is to outline some stylized facts concerning the key characteristics of part-time employment in EU countries as well as the impact of policy and institutions. Section 2 briefly reviews existing literature on part-time work and its determinants. Section 3 outlines the key differences in the incidence of part-time work and its development over time for each of the EU 1 The Stockholm Council set intermediate targets for 2005 of 67 per cent for the total employment rate and 57 per cent for female employment and an additional target to increase the EU employment rate for older women and men (aged 55-64) to 50 per cent by 2010. These objectives are meant to contribute to making the EU 'the most dynamic knowledge based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion'. 6 countries, by age group, gender, sector and occupation. We also consider the degree of involuntary part-time work for each of these categories. The second half of the paper turns to consideration of the role that economic policy has played in encouraging part-time work within EU countries. In Section 4, we first outline some of the main regulations and institutions that have a direct or indirect impact on the possibility or incentive to work part-time. Section 5 then uses a panel econometric setting to analyse and quantify the effect of labour market policy, as measured by institutions and regulations, on the rate of part-time work. Section 6 concludes.
The determinants of part-time work -A survey of the literature
Broadly speaking, the literature on part-time job developments to date can be divided into two main branches. The first branch relies on micro-econometric analysis based on firm surveys. The purpose of this branch is to identify the determinants of part-time work (Haskel et al., 1997; Houseman, 2001; Euwals and Hogerbrugge, 2004) to illustrate the role of part-time work as a flexible work arrangement (Haskel et al., 1997; Faber, 1999) , or to explain the transition between part-time jobs and other labour market states (Blank, 1994; O'Reilly and Bothfeld, 2002) .
Studies by, for example, Long and Jones (1981) , Nakamura and Nakamura (1983) and Blank (1988) investigated the determinants of the choice to work part time at one point in time, finding that women with younger children, more children and higher levels of non-labour income were more likely to work part time. A larger number of studies examined wage differentials between full and part-time staff, for example Nakamura and Nakamura (1983) and Blank (1990) , which typically found that equivalent part-time workers earn less per hour than their full-time counterparts, although the size of the measured effect varies across occupations.
A number of studies of part-time employment for individual countries exists. For example, Blank (1994) uses 14 years of data from the PSID to explore dynamic labour supply choices in the US among adult women between full-time, part-time and no labour market work.
Her results indicate that past history is a very important predictor of current labour supply.
Furthermore, most women use part-time work as a temporary alternative to full-time work or to being out of the labour market. Only for a small proportion of her female sample is part-time work used as a stepping stone to full-time employment. Doris (1998) studies the determinants of the growth in part-time work in Ireland over the 1980s, concluding that the growth in part-time work was predominantly supply-led and that the growth of the services sector facilitated this increase.
The second branch of literature considers part-time employment developments based on macro-data and includes sociological and institutional qualitative evidence (Smith et al., 1998; Delsen, 1998; OECD, 1998; Walwei, 1998) . In the same vein some papers have focused on international comparisons (Lemaitre et al., 1997) and attempted to understand the reason why 7 part-time work is so low in some countries such as Spain and Portugal (Ruivo et al., 1998) , or so different across countries (Pfau-Effinger, 1998 ).
The present paper belongs to this second branch of the literature, whilst extending it to consider explicitly the effect of national policy on part-time work through the use of a country panel of time-varying institutions and structural variables. This latter methodological approach can be associated with another branch of the labour market literature -initiated by Scarpetta (1996) and extended by Belot and van Ours (2000) , Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell et al. (2002) -which uses cross-sectional or pooled cross-sectional data on indicators of labour market performance and labour market institutions to account for unemployment differentials across countries.
Trends in part-time work in EU countries
We begin our analysis with a description of the main trends in part-time employment. A growing part-time employment share has been a main feature of a number of industrialized countries over the past two decades. to 19. This pattern of a high part-time employment rate for young and older workers, relative to prime-age workers, holds across countries, with the exception of Austria, Germany and Portugal which exhibit low rates of part-time work among the young relative to other age groups, and Luxembourg, where the share of part-time employment is similar across age groups. Young workers also experienced the fastest rate of growth in part-time work during the 1990s within the EU as a whole, although the growth rate has flattened out more recently.
A breakdown of part-time work by gender reveals that part-time workers are more likely to be women (see Figure 3 . The majority of part-time work within the EU is described by its workers as voluntary. The stylized facts presented in this section support the view that part-time employment represents an important opportunity for particularly young, older and female workers to enter the labour markets of the European Union. The rate of part-time work is clearly higher for these groups relative to prime-aged males, a pattern found to be broadly consistent across countries.
Furthermore, for the vast majority of workers in these groups, the decision to work part-time has been a voluntary one, which is all the more satisfactory in terms of welfare maximization.
However, as these stylized facts have stressed, both the level of part-time rate and its development over time varies strongly across the countries of the EU. This suggests that crosscountry differences in policy setting and institutions, together with other national structures (sectoral, demographic and societal), play an important role in the incidence of part-time work.
The remainder of the paper focuses on an investigation of these latter influences.
Regulations towards part-time work in EU countries
The regulatory and institutional framework varies considerably across countries of the EU and may represent an important influence on the cross-country development of part-time employment. A number of types of regulation may have a direct or indirect effect on the rate of part-time work. This section aims both to introduce the key regulations affecting working time across EU countries and to outline how such regulations differ across countries.
A number of regulations affect the rate of part-time work directly. This first set of regulations is legally binding and limits the use of part-time work. For instance, labour laws may
give the employer the right to deny an employee's request to work part-time under certain circumstances. Certain types of regulation may however facilitate the conversion of full-time jobs into voluntary part-time employment in order to reconcile personal and professional lives (Genre et al., 2003) .
A second set of regulations affects part-time employment indirectly through shifting the financial incentives for firms to offer part-time opportunities and also for employees to accept them. For example, wage regulation (including the regulation of working time premia for shiftwork or overtime), social protection systems and tax and benefit systems fall into this group. In some countries, for example Portugal, hourly wages for part-time and full-time work are restricted by law to be equal (pro rata clause). Moreover, hours or earnings thresholds for social insurance contributions (above which contributions to social security schemes become payable and workers become eligible for social benefits) and special subsidies or tax rebates for firms hiring part-time staff may influence the structure of non-wage costs for employers and therefore also indirectly influence the rate of part-time work. For example, during the period 1993-2000, special social security contribution rebates and reductions were granted to firms hiring part-time workers in France. This coincided with a boom in part-time employment over the same period.
Similarly, changes in hours and social security thresholds may also influence the supply of parttime work. For example, in Spain, a relaxation in working hour legislation, together with a reduction in social security contributions for part-time workers in 1994, resulted in a strong increase in the part-time employment rate between 1994 and 1995. However, lower pension entitlements may restrict the labour supply of part-time jobs (Ginn and Arber, 1998) . Sweden have not adopted specific legislation to encourage part-time work.
A third set of regulations and institutions influence employment in general, but may have an indirect bearing on part-time employment in particular. First, for mothers with young children it has been argued that the probability of (re-)entering the labour market, either in the form of full-time or part-time employment, is strongly linked with the system of child benefit/care arrangements in place. In general, the provision of child benefits can create an ''unemployment trap'' if benefits are means tested 6 . Moreover, some child benefit systems grant additional income to parents who renounce work in order to take care of their young children 7 . On the other hand, the lack of affordable (subsidized) childcare may represent a major disincentive to taking up employment.
Similarly, unemployment benefit systems (together with other benefits) may create an 'unemployment trap' through high net replacement rates and long benefit duration. Doudeijns (1998) studied the financial disincentive to work created by unemployment benefits, finding it had a significantly negative impact on the decision to take up part-time employment. However, 12 the recent development of 'in-work benefits', the tightening of benefit eligibility criteria and the enhanced controls over their implementation should all help towards alleviating this disincentive.
Tax systems, and in particular high income tax rates, may also deter part-time work through creating a financial disincentive for individuals to enter the labour market. Such a disincentive is reinforced when income tax is computed on the basis of a couple's earnings, rather than on an individual's, since in such a system the second earner in a couple may face a relatively high effective marginal rate. Dependant partner's allowances may make the decision to take up a job even harder, especially a low-paid part-time job, which would results in the loss of such a benefit.
Relatively strict employment protection legislation (EPL) has become a more and more important reason for hiring part-time employees. This is because part-time jobs may fall outside the sphere of regular contract EPL and may therefore offer employers the opportunity to bypass such legislation. In the late 1990s, in a context of increasing competition and uncertainty, firms realized the advantages of 'atypical jobs', which were and continue to be considered more flexible and less expensive. Part-time employment was quickly acknowledged as offering these advantages, together with temporary jobs, help agency employment, shift work, on-call jobs and atypical working time jobs (nights and weekends). Bentolila and Dolado (1994) This section has outlined both the number and type of labour market regulations and institutions that may affect the rate of part-time work. Some of these regulations affect part-time work directly and others indirectly. Furthermore there has been considerable variation in the extent and type of regulation applied across countries of the EU. The conclusions of this section therefore give good reason to think that part-time policies and other labour market institutions have contributed to explaining the growth in part-time employment in some EU countries. In order to quantify such effects the next section moves onto a panel econometric setting.
The effect of regulations and labour market institutions on part-time employment
This section focuses on quantifying the effect of labour market policy, as measured by institutions and regulation, on the development in the part-time employment rate (PTR -that is, share of those working part-time in total employment).
Data and estimation strategy
The part-time employment rate, as well as the share of involuntary part-time employment, was taken for each country from employment series reported in the annual European Community In order to capture the effect of part-time regulation on the part-time rate, we have created a vector of country-specific trends which starts from the year in which regulations of part-time employment were relaxed in each country 10 . The motivation for the creation of this variable is that we wish to capture the additional annual increase in part-time employment rate that follows the change in part-time regulation 11 . The starting date of each trend therefore varies by country and is identified by systematically exploiting the information reported in Table 5 .1.
For the countries where part-time regulation has not changed (Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the value of the variable is set to zero for the complete period 1983 to 2001.
To avoid an 'outlier' bias, we have also constructed the 'policy' variable excluding the trend for the Netherlands 12 .
Data on general labour market institutions are taken from the recent macroeconomic literature on labour markets (such as Nicoletti et al., 2000; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2002) . Most of these data on national labour market institutions are available only until 1997-98. We include variables to alternatively capture overall employment protection legislation (EPL) and EPL on temporary and regular contacts. An indicator for the provision of child benefits (drawn from Eurostat) is also used. Unemployment benefit replacement ratios and unemployment benefit duration are included to capture possible disincentive effects to take up a 14 part-time employment as a result of 'unemployment traps'. We also add the total labour tax rate, computed by the OECD and reported by Nickell et al. (2002) .
Other variables capturing important characteristics of the labour market, and which are expected to influence the rate of part-time work, are also included in our specification. Such controls are the female participation rate, fertility rate, share of employment in services, schooling rate of the 15-25 population and the share of temporary jobs. Finally we include the output gap stemming from the OECD Economic Outlook database to capture the business cycle.
Our model considers the level in the part-time employment rate, across countries and over time, that can be attributed to structural factors and institutions. α i are I country dummies and α t are T time dummies. INST k are K variables capturing national policies and institutions and C j are J variables representing controls (demographic, structural, macroeconomic or societal factors).
This specification is close to that used by Nickell et al. (2001) to explain OECD unemployment, but the variables for short-term macroeconomic shocks (labour demand shock, real import price shock, real interest rate and so on) are replaced by the output gap. Moreover, the lagged dependent variable has been dropped as its presence introduces correlation between the errors and the regressors, which can bias the GLS estimate of parameters. However, as there is clear evidence of non-stationarity for many of the variables used in this equation, there is a risk of 'spurious regression'. We use the Maddala-Wu test to check out whether there are unit roots in the residual of the equations. The test clearly rejects the hypothesis of the residuals having a unit root, which indicates the presence of cointegration relation between the variables.
As some heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation are detected, all regressions are estimated by feasible generalized least squares. To tackle possible endogeneity problems and checking for robustness, we also applied an instrumental variable method (the two-stage least squares within estimator). The presence of endogeneity may be particularly problematic in the case of the relationship between the part-time employment rate and participation, or between part-time employment and EPL, where the causality is likely to go both ways. Lacking alternatives, we instrument the structural and institutional variables by their values lagged by two years.
Results
As shown by Table 5 .1, a number of findings for the group of European countries that emerge from equation 1 are confirmed when using instrumental techniques (equation 7).
15
The change in part-time regulation turns out to have a very strong and significant impact on parttime employment developments. This still holds true when excluding the Netherlands, although the magnitude of the effect decreases somewhat. Thus we conclude that the relaxation of regulations towards part-time work in the EU countries has had a significantly positive effect on the development of the PTR.
Child benefits exert a strong negative and highly significant effect on the PTR. Thus child benefits act as a disincentive to working part time and make it less likely for individuals to (re-)enter the labour market through part-time employment. The reasoning behind this phenomenon may be that benefits alter the trade-off between work and leisure towards a more family-oriented life.
While overall EPL is only significant at a 10 per cent level, EPL on regular jobs is highly significant and has a strong and positive effect on the PTR. Conversely, EPL for temporary jobs is either insignificant or negatively related to the PTR.
Unemployment benefit replacement ratios are found to be negatively correlated with the PTR, but their statistical significance is not robust across estimated equations. Unemployment benefit duration seems to impact the PTR only modestly and its effect is estimated with little precision.
Although total labour taxes appear to affect positively the PTR in Table 5 .1, this result is not robust when using other specifications (Buddelmeyer, Mourre and Ward, 2004b) . This reflects the theoretical uncertainty as regards the overall impact of labour taxes on employment (for example, income versus substitution effects). Moreover, the total labour tax rate remains too crude and aggregate an indicator to fully identify the specific effect on part-time employment, which would require knowing the relative tax burden borne by part-timers compared to fulltimers.
Most controls turn out to be significant and of expected sign. The female participation rate is positively related to PTR. The rise in female participation has resulted in an increase in the part-time rate in many countries, which appears to have been used as the main way of integrating women into the labour market. Similarly the fertility rate and the schooling rate of the 15-25 population are also found to affect the PTR positively, and particularly in the case of the fertility rate, strongly. The share of employment in the service sector is revealed as a particularly powerful determinant of the rate of part-time work. This ties in with our analysis of the trends in part-time work in Section 3 which highlighted that a high proportion above of part-time jobs are within the service sector. The impact of the output gap is negative and significant in most equations, confirming earlier results from Buddelmeyer, Mourre and Ward (2004b) . Conversely the temporary employment rate is found to have a positive influence on the PTR, which suggests the absence of substitution between part-time employment and temporary employment, and that these two flexibility schemes are complementary in circumventing the rigidity of European labour markets.
The coefficients provided by (2) and (3) in Table 5 .1 -which amounts to between 1.6 and 3.5 percentage points rise after ten years. It follows that more effective policies or a faster pace of reform could entail larger rates of increase. With regard to institutions having an indirect effect on the PTR, our results reveal that a switch from the extreme case of no EPL regulation on regular contracts to the opposite situation of extremely stringent EPL 13 increases the PTR by around 11-15 percentage points. This implies that the future PTR will be sensitive to changes in EPL, although the effect might materialize with some lag. 
Policy conclusions
Our results indicate that the both the development of the part-time employment rate over time and the variation in the PTR across countries are significantly affected by institutional and policy changes. In particular policy measures geared toward encouraging part-time work are found to be positively related to actual part-time developments. These measures include both the legal framework affecting part-time positions and the creation of financial incentives (subsidies and improvement of social protection) to take up a part-time job. Moreover, other labour market institutions, including benefit systems, are found to significantly but indirectly influence the growth in part-time work. For instance, the stringency of employment protection legislation for regular contracts favours part-time work, suggesting that part-time employment may be firms' response to rigid labour markets. Furthermore, child benefits and, to a lesser extent unemployment benefit generosity and duration, may hinder the increase in the part-time rate through the disincentive to take up employment that they induce. Consequently, further reforms of labour market institutions can be expected to facilitate growth in part-time employment and thereby to pull more people into paid employment.
Our analysis shows that such reforms can contribute to meet the employment targets set for 2010 at the 2000 Lisbon Council meeting. Currently the low female and total employment rates in some EU countries require considerable efforts in order to succeed. Evidence from the boarder economic literature to date has shown that the increase in female participation and the increase in part-time employment seem to go hand in hand. Our results indicate that targeted policy to facilitate part-time employment represents a promising avenue worthy of further exploration. The increase in the proportion of part-time employment can be expected to continue, because its main driving forces (employers' desire for flexibility, service sector expansion, women's increased labour market participation and so on) are likely to persist in the medium to long run. Part-time work developments are also expected to disproportionately benefit the relatively underemployed age groups of young and older workers. Keeping more older workers in the workforce by offering part-time work solutions would also help to reduce the finanacial burden of an ageing population.
In addition to raising the employment rate in the European Union, part-time employment
gives employers greater flexibility in adjusting working hours to business requirements while achieving higher productivity. If freely chosen and protected by law, part-time jobs also offer workers a good way of striking a balance between their professional and private lives. 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 EU Euro area USA Japan Canada
Sources: OECD, Eurostat (Labour Force Surveys). Note: The shaded bars underline the non-EU countries. G e r m a n y G r e e c e S p a i n F r a n c e I r e l a n d I t a l y N e t h e r l a n d s A u s t r i a P o r t u g a l F i n l a n d a n y G r e e c e S p a i n F r a n c e I r e l a n d I t a l y N e t h e r l a n d s A u s t r i a P o r t u g a l F i n l a n d In 1998 the Spanish government and labour trade unions signed an agreement on part-time employment contracts which seeks to improve the conditions of part-time workers.
The 2001 decree on labour market reforms increased further the flexibility of part-time jobs: the decree allows working hours additional to the agreed part-time hours to be distributed over the year, with 7 days' notice given to the worker.
The reform provides employees with social security benefits pro-rata to the number of hours worked. Collective bargaining may permit the combination of vertical and horizontal part-time work. The decree repeals the law which allowed collective bargaining to set limits on the proportion of part-time workers in the full-time workforce. The decree lifts the ban on extra hours (paid at the same rate as ordinary hours below a ceiling) and overtime for part-timers (in the case of vertical part-time work) and introduces the possibility of making the distribution of work laid down in the individual employment contract flexible. In the case of parttime vacancies, employees already working full-time may ask to change their employment relationship into a part-time arrangement.
The decree establishes the principle of 'nondiscrimination' between part-time and full-time workers (no difference as regards trade union rights, pays, annual holidays, parental leaves, protection against workplace accidents and occupational illness and access to company training schemes).
A total of 310 million euros has been allocated to finance over 3 years relief on the social security contributions paid by employers in respect of part-time permanent recruitments which, in the course of 2000, give rise to an increase in employment.
Country Measure Incentives to employees Incentives to employers

Netherlands
The tripartite Agreement of Wassenaar (1982) introduced a long-term and collective-negotiation-based approach aimed at redistributing existing employment more effectively, that is, an approach which encompasses several methods of redistributing employment, such as working time reduction, part-time work. This led to a strong increase in part-time jobs in firms in the 1980s and the early 1990s, especially for women.
None None
The general principle of equal treatment, regardless of working time, was introduced in Labour Law in November 1996.
Part-time employees can claim the same rights as fulltime workers.
None Austria Solidaritätsprämienmodell (voluntary reductions in individual working time): from 1998, collective or work agreements may permit reduction of normal working hours in order to recruit registered unemployed persons. Reductions have to be agreed between the employer and each employee.
Employees working less than normal hours receive a proportion of unemployment benefit; employment rights are maintained.
None From 1998, employees over 50 with family care responsibilities may reduce working time while maintaining employment rights, subject to employer's agreement. This must be given if there are more than 10 employees and the employee is entitled to a part-time pension (Gleitpension).
Employment rights are maintained. None Finland Part-time supplement (since 1994): employees reduce their working-time by 40% to 60% with the agreement of the employer for 1 year. An unemployed person must be recruited to the same position.
The government pays half of lost wages, up to 1.7 times the unemployment benefit.
None
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (1998), EIRO website, national sources. 
